- the emergence of large independent producers of diamonds (BHP, Rio Tinto, Argail) and the creation of their own client base, the principles of selection of which are much more liberal than those that De Beers applies to its sightholders;
- the collapse of the USSR and, accordingly, The cardinal reformatting of the entire Soviet diamond industry, the consequence of which was, among other things, the unprecedented rise of speculative operations with rough diamonds, which developed in several directions at once. Firstly, in 1992-1998, Through a network of "joint border enterprises", the vast majority of which actually performed exclusively dealer functions, the market was thrown out perennial Gokhran effluent (according to various estimates from $ 7 to $ 12 billion), and secondly, with the help of political lobbying mechanisms in Yakutia, .n. "National lapidary industry", which operated a quota of 25% of the current production of ALROSA and actually engaged in mainly speculative operations with raw materials, thirdly, ALROSA itself was able to create its own client base, A significant part of which also began to take part in dealer operations. At the same time, in the post-Soviet space - in Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, the fragments of the former Soviet association "Kristall" also began to deal actively with dealership. It should be recalled that the diamond mining industry of the USSR was tightly integrated into the single-channel system for managing the world diamond market, created by De Beers, and did not conduct independent dealer operations;
- The specific development of the political process in a number of West African countries has led to the establishment of control over radical groups over a number of significant alluvial deposits and, accordingly, the creation of their own dealer networks, sometimes operating with significant volumes of rough diamonds (UNITA's diamond department).
Such consequences of the speculative boom may have been one of the factors contributing to the decision of De Beers to abandon monopolistic regulation of the market. Since 1999, there has been a gradual reduction in buffer effluent, the most serious instrument for price regulation. In 2000, De Beers officially announced the introduction of a new supply policy ( Supplier of Choice ). This new marketing model implies, among other things, careful monitoring of the speculative activity of sightholders through the consent of De Beers to audit their enterprises. About 30 customers of De Beers, especially distinguished during the speculative boom, were sightholder status.
The events of the 90s showed that the games of speculators could reach a scale seriously fraught with a collapse of the market. At the same time, there was a clear difference in the positions of the main market participants in relation to dealer operations. In the eyes of large mining companies, dealership looks evil, albeit inevitable. Their main task is to support and develop extremely capital-intensive mining operations, the rate of capital turnover in which is very low. This is a difficult business and for him the fluctuations in prices for final products - raw diamonds - are extremely sensitive. Ideal here would be a slow, but constantly rising price. A similar position is characteristic of enterprises that are really engaged in cutting. For them, dealership is a forced activity, a way of getting rid of the assortment of raw materials, which at the moment is not profitable for them to process. But the stability of the market, the absence of crises, is also extremely important for them. The position of a professional speculator, especially a large speculator, who possesses capital, which allows one to serve significant sinks, is diametrically opposed. As for the speculator in any market, the amplitude of price fluctuations is important for him-you can play both on the rise and at the bottom, that is, For him it is important to create crisis situations.
Subsequent events confirmed this alignment of forces. Significant price fluctuations in 2005 - 2006 analysts attributed to speculative games of predominantly Indian diamantaires, and record trade interventions by De Beers in the summer and autumn of 2005 - as an attempt to counteract these initiatives. As a means of limiting speculative activity, one can also consider vigorous vertical diversification of large extractive companies that are trying to build chains: mining - processing - sorting - cutting - jewelry production - marketing - retail chains where there is simply no place for dealer operations with rough diamonds.
Still, such measures can be considered a palliative, and profiteers who have incredibly grown over the past 15 years continue to pose a serious threat to market stability. However, due to a number of objective reasons, their prospects are far from brilliant. According to the opinion of competent experts, in the next five years the world diamond output will fall intensively, and the demand will grow vigorously. At current prices, demand by 2012 can reach $ 18 billion, and production will be about $ 9-10 billion. And this extraction will be concentrated in the hands of 5 corporations, of which two will account for about 70%. For the first time in the history of the diamond market, there will be a genuine, not artificially created, supply shortage of rough diamonds. In these conditions there are real prerequisites for reaching an agreement between the main producers of diamonds, Allowing if not completely remove from the market a speculative element, then limit its activities to the production minimum. In this case, the market for a long time and thoroughly return to the state of the "seller's market", which preserves the vitality of its main element - the mining companies. Feverish fluctuations in prices, so sweet to the heart of the speculator, will be replaced by monotonous growth and, in the final analysis, the consumer of jewelry with diamonds will pay for everything - judging by the forecasted demand, he is ready for it.
http://rough-polished.com/ru/analytics/11096.html
No comments:
Post a Comment